On uniform and ordinary Hart-Mas-Colell consistency on the domain of convex TU games
Abstract
We show that (a) on the domain of convex games there is no nonempty solution that satisfies Pareto optimality, the null-player property, and uniform Hart-Mas-Colell consistency, (b) on the domain of totally positive games, each homothetic image of the core with the Shapley value as center and a ratio in the unit interval as well as its relative interior satisfy uniform Hart-Mas-Colell consistency, and (c) on the domain of convex games, among the mentioned homothetic images of the core and their relative interiors, only the core itself and its relative interior satisfy ordinary Hart-Mas-Colell consistency. We use these consistency properties together with others to provide a new characterizations of the core ant its relative interior on the domain of convex games.
Co-Authors (if applicable)
Name
Affiliation
Country
Pedro Calleja
Universitat de Barcelona
Spain
Peter Sudhölter
University of Southern Denmark
Denmark
Presenter #2
Name
Dylan Laplace Mermoud
Email
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Affiliation
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Country
France
Title of Paper
Balancedness for non-emptiness: Generalization of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem
Presenter #3
Name
Eric Bahel
Email
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Affiliation
Virginia Tech
Country
US
Title of Paper
Stability in Shortest Path Problems
Co-Authors (if applicable)
Name
Affiliation
Country
Maria Gomez-Rua
Universidad de Vigo
Spain
Juan Vidal-Puga
Universidad de Vigo
Spain
Presenter #4
Name
Marina Nuñez
Affiliation
Universitat de Barcelona
Country
Spain
Title of Paper
A many-to-one job market: more about the core and competitive salaries
