A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced in 1991 by Gilboa and Lehrer who propose a generalization of the Shapley value. We explore the implications of weakening some of the properties
used in their characterization result. We propose new point valued solutions for global games. Our main contributions are the axiomatic characterizations of two families of values for global games.

This paper studies hazardous waste transportation problems. Due to their dangerous nature, the transportation of these waste implies a risk of incident having irreversible consequences on the environment. This problem has lead to a body of legal statutes that monitor the generation and transportation of hazardous waste. Assuming that the transport of hazardous waste is done in a cooperative manner on a transport network, this paper investigates how to share the cost of maintaining and operating such network among the involved agents.
We analyze the hazardous transportation problem from the viewpoint of axiomatic analysis. We consider several axioms that are derived from different environmental law principles and provide a characterization of a new allocation rule: the responsibility rule. Then we show that the responsibility rule coincides with the multi-choice Shapley value of an appropriate multi-choice game.

In music streaming platforms artists upload their songs and users listen the songs they want. Artist are paid according with the streaming times of their songs. The most popular payment method is the so called pro-rata, where artists are paid proportionally to the overall streaming times of their songs. Recently, some platforms started to use a new payment method called user-centric, where each user's subscription fee is divided proportionally among artists based on the songs listened by the user. We compare both payment methods using the axiomatic approach.

The axiomatic foundations of Bentham and Rawls solutions are discussed within the broader domain of cardinal preferences. It is unveiled that both solution concepts share all four of the following axioms: Nonemptiness, Anonymity, Unanimity, and Continuity. In order to fully characterize the Bentham and Rawls solutions, three variations of a consistency criterion are introduced and their compatibility with the other axioms is assessed. Each expression of consistency can be interpreted as a property of decision-making in uncertain environments.