We analyze a moral hazard problem where a firm incentivizes a team of complementary workers by designing a robust incentive scheme that relies on individual and team performance measures.

While using both measures minimizes information rents, team-performance bonuses expose workers to \textit{strategic uncertainty} about their colleagues' effort. We show that the firm typically sacrifices statistically-relevant information to curb strategic uncertainty, compensating some workers solely based on their individual performance.

We provide a complete characterization of the optimal incentive scheme, highlighting how the firm discriminates among (possibly homogeneous) workers in terms of total rents, type of contract offered, and monitoring some workers more closely than others. Finally, we use this characterization to study the workers' incentives to facilitate or hinder the firm's monitoring. We show that competition for better contracts incentivizes workers to be more transparent, triggering an unraveling result that only benefits the firm, delivering the same payoffs as the firm-preferred equilibrium. That is, the competition gives rise to a self-promotion trap.

In a multi-agent moral hazard setting, we study the optimal design of the monitoring and compensation scheme to uniquely implement universal high effort when the principal has a limited number of contractible messages available. If restrictions on this number are maximally strong, the optimal incentive contract features intra-firm completion: sub-teams compete for a bonus payment, and each worker's impact on their team's success is chosen optimally. As the number of available contractible messages increases, using more intricate ways to misalign workers' wage schemes allows the principal to extract the full surplus from a number of workers that is growing exponentially in the number of available messages.

We consider a dynamic adverse selection model where privately informed sellers
of divisible assets can choose how much of their asset to sell at each point in time
to competitive buyers. With commitment, delay and lower quantities are equivalent
ways to signal higher quality. Only the discounted quantity traded is pinned down
in equilibrium. With spot contracts and observable past trades, there is a unique and
fully separating path of trades in equilibrium. Irrespective of the horizon and the

frequency of trades, the same welfare is attained by each seller type as in the commitment case. When trades can take place continuously over time, each type trades all of its assets at a unique point in time. Thus, the only delay is used to signal higher quality. When past trades are not observable, the equilibrium only coincides with the
one with public histories when trading can take place continuously over time.

This paper considers interactions between principal and multiple agents, as in Green and Stokey (1983). Our main innovation is the empathetic preferences of the agents. We assume perfect observability of efforts but allow for heterogenous interdependence of preferences among agents. We characterize optimal contracts in the deterministic setting and derive the implications of empathetic concerns for extensive margin decisions (hiring agents, team composition.)