Multiple long run players play one amongst multiple possible stage games in each period. They observe and recall past play and are aware of the current stage game being played, but are maximally uncertain about the future evolution of stage games. This setup is termed an uncertain repeated game. The solution concept requires that a subgame perfect equilibrium be played no matter what sequence of stage games realize. The feasible set of payoffs is then so large and complex that it is not obvious how to frame standard results such as the folk theorem, and further how to construct credible rewards and punishments that work irrespective of the future evolution of games. The main goal of the paper is to build such a language and then to construct credible dynamic incentives that work generally for uncertain repeated games. The characterization of equilibrium outcomes is complete for large discount factors and strongly symmetric equilibria, and through an outer bound, shown to be tight for general discounting and asymmetric equilibria.

We develop a continuous-time model of dynamic predatory behavior à la Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Matthews and Mirman (1983). An incumbent who is privately informed about whether the demand is strong or weak faces a potential entrant who decides when, if ever, to pay an entry cost to become an incumbent’s competitor or take an outside option. The incumbent
chooses its output so to affect the market price, which is a noisy signal of the market demand. We provide a complete characterization of Markov perfect
equilibria as a solution to a system of differential equations and show how to leverage its tractability to investigate the welfare effects of predation. We
show that even when limit pricing is unsuccessful in preventing entry, entry may occur too late from the point of view of social welfare: depending on the
strategy of the incumbent, the potential entrant may anticipate being able to observe informative signals about the demand and hence has incentives to
wait longer before entering.

This paper aims to explore three crucial questions concerning the innovation of risky products: firstly, the appropriate model for failure rates, secondly, the potential dangers of transitioning from small-scale experiments to large-scale testing with products that may possess harmful qualities, and thirdly, the impact of competitive pressure on the premature introduction of hazardous new products to the market.
Boeing had scheduled a high-profile launch of its new 777X jetliner for mid-March 2019. However, following the tragic events of the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air crashes just three days earlier, the event was cancelled. This raises the question of whether competitive pressure from Airbus may have played a role in these crashes. This paper aims to address the question of how long a producer should experiment with a potentially risky new product before introducing it to consumers. I also investigate how the duration of experimentation is influenced by competition in a duopoly and whether it is impacted by the degree of correlation between the risks faced by the duopolists.