How do cryptocurrency exchanges compete with each other? We show that small and large crypto exchanges appear to be complements, rather than substitutes, as traditional oligopoly theory would predict. When large exchanges list new tokens, trade volumes on small exchanges increase, and small exchanges become more likely to list. We rationalize these facts in a model where small exchanges have captive customer bases, and rely on arbitrage trade with large exchanges for liquidity provision. Our results imply that large exchanges' listing decisions play a systemically important ``leader'' role in determining trade volumes and listings on other exchanges.

This paper demonstrates that increasing bank presence in underserved areas can substantially improve households’ health. I apply a regression discontinuity design to a policy of the Reserve Bank of India. Six years after the policy introduction, treatment districts have 19% more branches than control districts. Households’ probability of suffering from a non-chronic disease in a given month is 36% lower. I show evidence that two understudied aspects of banking play a role: banks provide health insurance to households and credit to hospitals. In equilibrium, I observe an increase in health care demand and supply.